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NOTES
Civil Procedure: Exclusion of Injured or Disfigured
Plaintiffs from Trial - Cary v. Oneok, Inc. - A
Solution to the Exclusion Issue or Bad Precedent?
I. Introduction
When filing a lawsuit, most people automatically assume that they have the right
to be present during their trial. Few people, however, can articulate the source
which grants parties the right to be present at their trial.1 The right to be present
during trial cannot be traced to an express constitutional provision) Nonetheless,
many courts base the right on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.3 In Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co..' the United States Supreme
Court suggested that the right to be present stems from the right to be heard.5 The
Fillippon decision also indicates that the Court's concern was that someone be
present to protect the plaintiffs interests.' While most courts may agree that a party
has the right to be present during trial, case law often varies concerning the nature
and extent of this right.7 Some view the exclusion issue as a matter of fairness8
while others view the issue in constitutional terms According to the former view,
the exclusion issue should be determined by trial judges as a part of their
supervisory authority over the proceedings."0 "The focus of this view is on the

1. See Allen P. Grunes, Exclusion of Plaintiffsfrom the Courtroom in PersonalInjury Actions:
A Matter of Discretion or ConstitutionalRight?, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 388 (1987-88).
2. See id. at 391.
3. See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Mhe extent of a civil
litigant's right to be present at trial is appropriately analyzed under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment."); Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1940) ("The due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment ... requires that a defendant be [given] the right to be present in person or by
counsel.
4. 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
5. See id. at 81 ("We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the
proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who attend for the purpose to be present
in person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time the jury is impaneled until it is discharged after
rendering the verdict.").
6. See supra note 5; see also Grunes, supra note 1, at 393 ("The use of the disjunctive word 'or
makes it clear that the Court was not concerned about the rights of a litigant to be present in the
courtroom per se; rather, the concern was that there be someone present to assert and protect the litigant's
interests.").
7. See Grunes, supra note 1, at 389.
8. See Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964); see also Morley v. Superior Court of
Ariz., 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981); infra note 29.
9. See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213-18 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. See Grnes, supra note 1, at 389.
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integrity of the proceedings from the standpoint of overall fairness."" Under the
latter view, courts find that the right to be present is protected by constitutional
provisions, such as the right to due process of law." This view vests supervisory
responsibility in the appellate court rather than the trial court."
Courts have recently begun to consider challenges to a litigant's presence at
trial. 4 Exclusion of a litigant from trial most often arises in personal injury cases.
The plaintiffs injuries in these cases are often disfiguring and grotesque. The
defendant usually claims that the plaintiffs presence in the courtroom will unfairly
prejudice the jury against the defendant. In cases discussing exclusion of injured or
disfigured. plaintiffs, several courts balance the right of a party to be present at trial
against the prejudicial effect of the plaintiffs presence on the jury."
This note discusses the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Cary v.
Oneok, Inc." In a 5-4 decision the court held that in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, a party may not be excluded from the courtroom solely on the basis
of physical appearance." Part II of this note examines decisions discussing the
exclusion issue from other jurisdictions as well as relevant Oklahoma law prior to
the decision in Car),. Part III of this note discusses the facts of Cary and the
reasoning followed in the majority opinion, while also addressing the dissenting
opinion's view. Part IV of this note analyzes the Cary decision by demonstrating
the inappropriateness of the court's analysis and conclusion.
II. Background Information
A. Other Jurisdictions- A FunctionalApproach
A uniform approach among the courts regarding the exclusion of injured or
disfigured plaintiffs has recently emerged. These courts have held that a litigant
should not be excluded from trial unless he or she is unable to comprehend trial
proceedings or to assist counsel, and his or her presence would materially increase
the risk of jury prejudice. 9 Courts have taken a functional approach to the

11. Il
12. See id.
13. See id.

14. See id. at 388.
15. See Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Physical Conditionof Plaintiffin PersonalInjury Action
as Affecting Right to Be Presentat Trial, 27 A.L.R.4TH 583, 584 (1981).
16. 940 P.2d 201 (Okla.1997).

17. See id. at 202.
18. See Grunes, supra note 1,at 389. See generally Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 638 P.2d
1331 (Ariz. 1981); Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964).
19. See Grunes, supra note 1,at 389; see also Province v. Center for Women's Health & Family
Birth, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 675 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when excluding an infant from the liability phase of the trial where the infant was unable to communicate
with counsel); Caputo v. Sexcona Trucking Co., 611 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff from the courtroom during the
liability portion of the proceedings where the plaintiffs presence would have impaired the jury's ability
to perform its task objectively); Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 669 (N.D.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss1/5

1999]

NOTES

exclusion issue, viewing it in "terms of the purposes served by the litigant's
presence in the courtroom."" However, courts are not in agreement as to the
nature and extent of a plaintiffs right to be present at trial.
The first case to view the exclusion issue in functional terms was Dickson v.
Bober." In Dickson, the defendant injured Allan Dickson, a minor, when his car
collided with Dickson's motorcycle.' Clarence Dickson, acting on behalf of Allan,
sued the defendant for negligence." The trial judge excluded Allan from the

courtroom during the trial, and Clarence Dickson appealed the ruling.24 The
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the minor's exclusion by first determining that the

decision to exclude a plaintiff is within the trial court's discretion.' The court
reasoned that Allan's exclusion was "probably necessary to preserve an atmosphere
of fairness while the evidence with respect to liability was being presented and
assessed."' The court determined that Allan's rights were protected by his

guardian, who brought the action for him, and by his attorney.' The Minnesota
Supreme Court also stated that a plaintiffs presence is irrelevant to the deter-

mination of liability.'
The Dickson court balanced the plaintiffs right to be present at trial against the
probable prejudice to the defendant resulting from the plaintiffs presence. The court
also drew a distinction between litigants who could meaningfully participate at trial
and those who could not."

1995) (holding that a plaintiff who is unable to understand the proceedings or assist counsel may be
excluded from the liability portion of a bifurcated trial if the trial court determines that the party's
presence would be unfairly prejudicial).
20. Grunes, supra note 1,at 389.
21. 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964).
22. See i. at 529.
23. See id.
24. See i.
25. See id.
at 530.
26. Id.Allan was unable to comprehend or contribute to the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court
stated: "The accident changed Allan Dickson from a vital, intelligent, healthy youth to one unable to
express or sustain himself, helpless and entirely dependent on others, and wholly unable to comprehend
trial proceedings." Id.
at 529.
27. See id at 530.
at 530 n.3 ("Separation of issues for purposes of trial would be an effective way of
28. See id.
permitting a plaintiff whose appearance is relevant to the issue of damages to be present when and if that
question is decided and to be absent when evidence relevant to legal responsibility is being presented
to the jury.").
29. See Grunes, supra note I, at 398; see also Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 638 P.2d 1331,
1334 (Ariz. 1981) ("[A] plaintiff unable by reason of his injuries to contribute to or understand the
proceedings may be excluded, in the court's discretion, from the trial of the liability issue if the plaintiff
will be fully and adequately represented by counsel."). In Morley, the trial court excluded the comatose
plaintiff from the liability and damages portions of the bifurcated proceedings. Id. at 1332-33. The court
stated further that "where the plaintiff's mere presence would prejudice the jury, then failure to exclude
the plaintiff during the liability phase would deny the defendant's right to an unbiased jury when the
source of the bias is totally irrelevant to the liability issue." Id. at 1334.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with the exclusion
issue in Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories.' In Helminski, the plaintiffs, as next
friends of their minor son, sued the defendant alleging that the minor's developmental disabilities were the result of his mother's exposure to the defendant's product
during her pregnancy."1 Prior to trial, the plaintiffs' attorney agreed to present the
minor to the jury by videotape.32 Plaintiffs' counsel later announced his intention
to call the minor as a witness during trial,33 despite the previous agreement. The
defendant objected to the minor's presence and as a result, the district court
bifurcated the proceedings, excluding the minor from the liability phase.' The
plaintiffs alleged that the minor's exclusion deprived him of due process of law.3s
The Sixth Circuit established a two part test to determine whether the exclusion
of a litigant violates due process. First, a court must determine if a party's mere
presence will be prejudicial.' Second, if a court determines that a party's presence
would be prejudicial to his opponent, it must consider whether the party can
understand the proceedings and assist counsel in any meaningful way." "If the trial
court concludes that a party can comprehend the proceedings and assist counsel in
any meaningful way, the party cannot be involuntarily excluded regardless of
prejudicial impact."' The Helminski court stated that in such a case, cautionary
instructions will protect the interests of a defendant.39
The court concluded, however, that the exclusion of the minor did not constitute
reversible error.' "Under the facts of this case ... [w]here the [plaintiffs] acted
as [the minor's] next friends and legal representatives ... and where [the minor]
was unable to assist his attorney in any meaningful way,""' it was not a violation
of his due process 6ights to exclude him.
The Helminski court treated the exclusion issue as a matter of the plaintiffs due
process rights while Dickson and Morley focused on the risk of jury prejudice."'
The Helminski court applied the due process rationale to the trial court's determination of likely jury prejudice 3 The Sixth Circuit defined prejudice strictly as
"whether the party's presence would prevent or substantially impair the jury from
performing its duties in accordance with its instructions and its oath. '

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
See id. at 210.
See id. at 211.
See id
See id. at 212.
See id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id at 217.
See id. at 218.
Id.
See id.
See id.

41. Id.
42. See Gnines, supra note 1, at 404.
43. See Helninskd, 766 F.2d at 217.

44. Id.
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Shortly after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Helminski, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio examined the exclusion issue in In re
In
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Benedictin" Products Liability Litigation.
Richardson, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of Benedictin on behalf of their
minor crippled children. 4 The trial court bifurcated the proceedings and excluded
the children from the liability portion' The Richardson court began its analysis
by discussing Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." The court stated that
the rationale behind this rule was important to determining whether a plaintiff
should be excluded from trial 9 According to Rule 403, relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.- "While the presence of birth
defect plaintiffs should not be evidence ... [i]t is beyond argument that... the
appearance
of children with birth defects might confuse the issues or mislead the
5''t
jury.
The Richardsoncourt then discussed and applied the Helminski test. The court
stated that the children's testimony was not pertinent nor could the children
meaningfully assist counsel at trial.' While it may appear that the Richardson
court actually followed Helminski, a closer look at the reasoning in the opinion
reveals that the court really followed the Dickson and Morley approach. For
example, the court stated "[tihe mere presence of severely handicapped young
children could render the jury unable to arrive at an unbiased judgment concerning
liability."' The court stated further, "A fair trial contemplates fairness to both
sides ...[t]he probative value of a deformed child or children in the courtroom on
an issue of liability alone is nonexistent. The unfair prejudicial effect of the
presence of that child is beyond calculation."' However, the court concluded that
once liability is established, the deformed child would be a critical witness to help
determine damages 55
B. Oklahoma Law
Prior to the decision in Cary, Oklahoma case law did not address the exclusion
of disfigured or injured plaintiffs from trial. Oklahoma law did discuss a party's
general right to attend trial. In Waddle v. Waddle,' the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals stated, "[a]s a general rule, a party is not required to attend court during

45. 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
46. See id.at 1216.
47. See id. at 1222.

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See i&.
51. Id.

52. See id. at 1224.
53. Id.

54. Id.
55. See id.
56. 868 P.2d 751 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
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trial." Further, th.a Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Nicoma Park
Radio & Television Service, 8 that a party should have a reasonable opportunity to
attend his trial." According to article 2, section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution,'
a party should have "access to a court if he has suffered a wrong which is
recognized in the law." 6' Article 2, section 6 has never been interpreted to require
a party's presence at his or her trial.'
Besides addressing a party's general right to attend trial, Oklahoma case law also
discusses due process requirements concerning a party's presence at trial. In In re
Rich,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that "courtroom confrontation with
one's civil adversary is not required by due process or other constitutional
strictures."" In Rich, the defendant's parents-in-law brought an action to terminate
the defendant's parental rights.' The defendant was unable to attend the
proceedings becausa he was in prison.' The district court determined that the
children were deprived and terminated the defendant's parental rights.67 On appeal,
the defendant alleged that his involuntary absence from the proceedings denied him
due process of law.' The Rich court stated that Oklahoma law allows testimony
from an incarcerated witness to be taken by deposition.' The court went on to say
that the defendant was entitled to a "meaningful and fair opportunity to defend in
a family-status suit... [and his] opportunity to meet the issues raised via deposition
testimony was nowhere impaired."7 The Rich court concluded that the defendant's
absence did not deny him the opportunity for a fair and just hearing.7
In a similar case, Bell v. Great Lakes Container Corp.,' the Oklahoma Court

of Appeals examined due process requirements concerning the absence of a witness.
The Bell court noted that no authority supports the "contention that the credibility
of a witness can only be determined by a court which hears and sees a witness. Of
course, [this] is an advantage but it is not absolutely essential."' It is not a denial
of due process for a judge to decide a matter without observing a witness.74 Due

57. Id. at 753.
58. 408 P.2d 770 (Okla. 1965).
59. See id. at 774.
60. OKLA. CONST. ait. II, § 6 ("The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and
speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or
reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.").
61. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 919 (Okla. 1989).
62. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 203 (Okla. 1997).
63. 604 P.2d 1248 (Okla. 1979).
64. Id. at 1253.
65. See id.at 1250.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1253.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. 702 P.2d 387 (Olda. Ct. App. 1985).

73. Id. at 391.
74. See id.
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process requires an "orderly proceeding... [where] the parties have an opportunity
to be heard, and to defend, enforce and protect their rights.""5 Fairness requires an
absence of bias in the trial of cases.76
II. Cary v. Oneoklnc.
A. Facts
Oneok, Inc. inspected and ignited a water heater in the Cary household.'
Shortly thereafter, the water heater exploded and severely burned Eric Cary, who
was not quite three years old.78 As a result of the explosion, Eric is permanently
disfigured." Eric's mother, on Eric's behalf, sued Oneok for negligence. Prior
to trial, Oneok moved to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages portions.8
Oneok also requested that Eric be excluded from the liability portion of the trial.'
The trial court granted the motion for bifurcation and then excluded Eric from the
liability portion of the trial.' The trial court reasoned that Eric's presence would
be unfairly prejudicial.
Cary's counsel objected to Eric's exclusion.' The jury
returned a verdict for Oneok on the issue of liabilityM and the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed.'
Cary's counsel then petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court for certiorari." On
appeal, Cary's attorney argued that article 2, section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution
guarantees that a party be permitted to attend his own civil trial.' Cary's counsel
further asserted that Eric's presence would aid him because it would demonstrate to
the jury the "actual person" whose life had been affected9 Oneok's attorney
argued that Eric's presence would serve no legitimate purpose and would "inflame
the passions of the jury."'" Further, counsel for Oneok argued that the Oklahoma
Constitution does not guarantee an individual the right to be present during his or
her trial.'

75. Malone v. Malone, 591 P.2d 296,298 (Okla. 1979); see also McMinn v. State Indus. Court, 366
P.2d 954, 957 (Okla. 1961) (stating that due process requires "due notice to the adversary parties, with
an opportunity to be fully heard").
76. See Hoernan v. Western Heights Bd. of Educ., 913 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
77. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201 (Okla. 1997).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

89. See id. at 203.

90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
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A closely divided court held that it was error to exclude Eric from the liability
portion of the trial. 93 Consequently, the Court of Civil Appeals' decision was
reversed and the judgment for Oneok was vacated.' The court stated that in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, a party may not be excluded from the
courtroom based on physical appearance alone."
B. Majority Opinion

Vice Chief Justice Summers began the majority opinion by stating that the issue
presented in Car), was one of first impression in Oklahoma.' The opinion
discussed various cases from other jurisdictions," concluding that these courts
agree on two points: "(1) The ideals behind due process and a fair trial permit a
party to be present in the courtroom absent extreme conditions and (2) the
possibility of juror sympathy alone is not juror prejudice, and is insufficient to
exclude a party from the courtroom."" The majority reasoned that "we find no
authority for the proposition that a party may be excluded solely by reason of his
disfigurement."' The court stated that a party's physical appearance does not
amount to an "extreme circumstance" warranting exclusion." The court further
reasoned that the party seeking exclusion bears the burden of showing that he
cannot obtain a fair trial unless the plaintiff is excluded.'
The majority pointed out that if Eric was simply an observer, he would have been
permitted in the ccurtroom.'" "It is impermissible that he is kept from observing
and participating in the proceedings solely because of his status as a party who was
burned and is thus physically scarred."'" The court went on to say that the
likelihood of jury sympathy is not the equivalent of prejudice." "A jury will
generally follow tie court's instructions and decide a case based on the law
presented."'"
The majority discussed the two part test set forth in Helminski.' "[O]nly if the
court has found that in addition to the physical condition the party's mental state is
such that he or she can neither comprehend the proceedings nor aid counsel in

93. See id. at 206.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 202.

96. See id. at 203.
97. See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985); Morley v. Superior Court of
Ariz., 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981); Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952); Mason
v. Moore, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1996); Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d
666 (N.D. 1995).
98. Gary, 940 P.2d at 204.

99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.

102. See id.
103. Id.
at 204-05.
at 205.
104. See id.

105. Id.
106. See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 217-18 (6th Cir. 1985).
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presenting the case, does the court have discretion to exclude him or her from the
liability phase of the trial."'" Applying the Helminski test to Cary, the majority
concluded that the test was not satisfied." The majority stated that there was no
evidence to support the conclusion that Eric could not meaningfully comprehend the
proceedings." The court stated that Oneok failed to show that Eric would have
been of no assistance to his attorney."' "Oftentimes, it is essential for the proper
presentation of the case to have the client at hand ready to prompt the crossexaminer and respond to his inquires..' Unlike the Sixth Circuit in Helminski,
which held that the exclusion of the minor was harmless, the majority stated that
extending the harmless error doctrine to the case at bar would "trivialize [Eric's]
right to observe and be part of the proceedings which likely will profoundly
influence much of the rest of his life.""'
C. Dissenting Opinion
Unlike the majority opinion, which primarily followed the Helminski approach,
Justice Opala's dissenting opinion listed several reasons that Eric's exclusion during
the liability portion of the proceedings was proper. First, the dissent pointed out that
Eric's status was that of a non-party whose action was brought in his name."'
4
According to title 12, section 2017 of the Oklahoma Statutes," a minor cannot
sue or defend except by guardian. The minor's legal representative "conducts,
The dissent concluded that the legal
manages and controls the litigation.'.
representative is the dominus litis," ' or master of the litigation. Further, the right
to remain in the courtroom is vested in the legal representative, who was Eric's
mother."" The dissent went on to say "[a]lthough the minor is the sole real party
in interest (in whose name litigation must be brought and who would have the
requisite stake in the outcome to meet standing requirements), as a person non sui
juris he is not a party to the suit but a beneficiary of its proceeds.". Consequently, the right to courtroom presence cannot attach to a child who is represented
by a legal representative."'

107. Cary,940 P.2d at 205.

108. See id
109. See id.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id at 206.
Id.
Id.
See id.(Opala, J., dissenting).

114. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2017(C) (1991) ("Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a
representative such as a general guardian... the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant
or incompetent person.").
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Caty, 940 P.2d at 209.
See id.
See id.
Id.at 210.
See id.at211.
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Second, the dissent observed that "national jurisprudence" holds that no claim to
one's courtroom presence is absolute.'" "It should be weighed against the opposite
party's right to a fair trial - one that is free of prejudice likely to be engendered
in the triers of fact.'.' The dissent reasoned that, according to the majority of case
law dealing with the exclusion issue, exclusion of a litigant is free from error if "1)
the litigant's appearance or conduct is likely to prejudice the defendant; 2) the
litigant's testimonial participation is neither necessary nor expected; and, 3) the
litigant cannot assist counsel in any meaningful way."" The dissenting opinion
stated further that if an excluded litigant's presence is not critical to his effective
representation at trial, it is not unfair to exclude him."
Third, the dissent argued that a ruling within the trial court's discretion should not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." "To reverse a trial court order on
[an] abuse-of-discretion standard, it must appear that the decisionmaker reached a
clearly erroneous conclusion that is contrary to sound principles of reason and
evidence."" The dissent stated that a trial court must withhold prejudicial
information from the jury." Further, the dissent pointed out that the district court
record would not lead one to conclude that the decision was contrary to reason."
Testimony indicated that Eric remembered little about the accident, and he was not
expected to be called as a witness." Therefore, the dissent concluded that the trial
court's ruling was not abusive.'"
Fourth, the dissenting opinion stated that the rule crafted by the majority violated
Oneok's right to. an impartial jury as guaranteed by article 2, section 7'"'of the
Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 3' to the United States
Constitution.' The dissenters in Cary concluded that when a defendant satisfies
the three part test under the majority view,"' protections embodied in the federal
and respective state constitutions are invoked."' Once a defendant has satisfied
this burden, the trial court may, exercising its discretion over the proceedings,
exclude a litigant whose presence will unfairly prejudice a defendant.'

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 214.

125. Id.
126. See id.

127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.

130. OKLA. CON T. art. II, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.").
131. U.S. CONST. amnend. XIV ("[Nior shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of I iw....
").
132. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 206.
133. See id. at 212.
134. See id. at 214.
135. See id. at 212.
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Finally, the dissenting opinion stated that the majority's reversal of the exclusion
order violated two statutory provisions that make reversal of a judgment impermissible." First, according to title 12, section 78 of the Oklahoma Statutes,137 an

appellate court may not reverse a judgment unless an error affects the substantial
rights of the parties." Second, title 20, section 3001.1'3 forbids reversal where

the error complained of does not involve a miscarriage of justice.'" The dissent
concluded that Eric's exclusion neither affected his substantial rights nor resulted in

a miscarriage of justice.''
IV. Analysis of Cary v. Oneok, Inc.
The majority opinion disregarded current Oklahoma law" by creating a new
doctrine which precludes a litigant's exclusion from the courtroom in the absence
of exceptional circumstances. Additionally, the majority disregarded years of prior
case law from other jurisdictions holding that a person's right to be present in court

is not absolute. The majority's conclusion violated Oneok's right to a fair trial.
Finally, the majority's decision was inappropriate because the court overlooked
several applicable evidentiary provisions.
A. Oklahoma Law
The majority disregarded the applicable standard for reviewing a trial court's

decision. The Supreme Court must affirm the trial court's decision unless the court
finds an abuse of discretion.'43 To reverse on the grounds of abuse of discretion,

the trial judge must make a clearly erroneous conclusion against reason and
evidence.'" The trial court's decision to exclude Eric was not against reason and
evidence, and thus should have been upheld. Neither Eric's mother nor Oneok
disputed Eric's extensive disfigurement nor the fact that his presence might have
prejudiced the jury.' Further, the record supported the conclusion that Eric could

not assist counsel at trial in a meaningful way.'" Consequently, the majority

136. See id. at 216.
137. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 78 (1991) ("The court, in every stage of action, must disregard any error
or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party;
and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.").
138. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 216.
139. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991) ("No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any
appellate court of this state in any case, civil or criminal .... for error in any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless .. .the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice or
constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.").
140. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 216.
141. See htL
142. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
143. See Eskridge v. Ladd, 811 P.2d 587,590 (Okla. 1991); In re Crane's Estate, 206 P.2d 726,729
(Okla. 1949).
144. See Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Asher, 863 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Okla. 1993); Abel v. Tisdale,
619 P.2d 608, 612 (Okla. 1980).
145. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 214.
146. See Id ("There was testimony that Cary - six years old at the time of trial - remembered
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improperly overruled the trial court's exclusion order. A "trial judge is in the best
position to make a determination on matters which may affect the jury's performance of its duties."' 47
Additionally, the majority overlooked two Oklahoma statutory provisions
prohibiting reversal of a trial court's judgment. Title 12, section 78 of the Oklahoma
Statutes provides that a court must disregard an error or defect in the proceedings
which doesn't affect the substantial rights of a party. Further, section 78 states that
no judgment shall be reversed for such an error. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated in Parrisv. McCallay" that if a judgment is in accord with a verdict of a
properly instructed jury and supported by the evidence, it will not be reversed
because of procedural errors unless there is a substantial violation of a party's
constitutional rights. 4 Eric's constitutional right to be heard was not substantially
violated because his; legal representative protected this right by appearing in court
on his behalf.'" In Cary, where the verdict was supported by the evidence and
Eric's constitutional right to be heard was not substantially violated, the trial court's
judgment should have been upheld.
The majority also ignored title 20, section 3001.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
which provides that an appellate court may not reverse a judgment unless the error
results iin a miscariage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a
constitutional or statutory right."' The majority disregarded these statutory
provisions by reversing the trial court's judgment, and this reversal extends beyond
the proper role of an appellate court.
In creating a new doctrine, the majority opinion also failed to adhere to relevant
Oklahoma precedent. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined in In re Rich'
that due process does not require courtroom confrontation with one's civil
adversary." In Rich, the court concluded that the defendant's absence from trial
did not deny him the opportunity for a fair and just hearing"s because he could
address the issues raised via deposition testimony.' Similarly, Eric's presence was
not critical to addressing the issues raised in the liability portion of the proceedings.
Eric was not scheduled to be a witness"s and it is difficult to see how, under the
circumstances, Eric's presence would have made any difference. Moreover, the
majority's statement that "fo]ftentimes it is essential for the proper presentation of
the case to have the client at hand ready to prompt the cross-examiner and respond

little about the circumsttnces surrounding the harm dealing occasion and, at different times, reported
widely varying accounts of the event. He was neither necessary nor expected to be called as a witness.").
147. Grunes, supra note 1, at 396.
148. 424 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1967).
149. See iL at 63.
150. See Grunes, supra note 1,at 393; Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81 (1919).
151. See supra note 139.
152. 604 P.2d 1248 (Okla. 1979).
153. See id. at 1253.
154. See id
155. See ide
156. See Cary v. Oreok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 207 (Okla. 1997).
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to his inquiries"'" is misplaced. First, Eric could not recall the accident. If a client
cannot remember what happened, it is doubtful that he can respond to inquiries.
Further, Eric was six years old at the time of the proceedings. A child of that age
will in all likelihood not be able to "prompt the cross-examiner." Consequently, the
majority's rationale for concluding that Eric's presence at trial was warranted is
incorrect. Eric's mother adequately protected his interests in trial, satisfying Rich.
Counsel felt this way all along, as demonstrated by the fact that he did not schedule
Eric as a witness at trial.
Another relevant case that the majority chose to ignore is Bell v. Great Lakes
ContainerCorp.' In Bell, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals determined that
it was not a denial of due process for a judge to decide a matter without observing
a witness.'59 While it is preferable for a court to hear and see a witness, it is not
absolutely essential."w Eric's presence is much like the testimony of a witness; his
appearance is testimony of his injuries. Under the reasoning in Bell, the jury may
have determined Oneok's liability without observing Eric.
Moreover, the majority's holding in Cary makes title 12, section 2018(D) of the
Oklahoma Statutes of little consequence in personal injury actions where the
plaintiff is disfigured. Section 2018(D) states that the court may order a separate
trial of any claim to avoid prejudice. "[B]ifurcation of trial of the liability and
damages issues... avoid[s] completely the possibility of prejudice." 6' According
to the majority, a party may not be excluded on the basis -of physical appearance
alone." Thus, the majority creates a hard and fast rule that even where the
proceedings are bifurcated, a disfigured plaintiff cannot be excluded from the
liability portion of the trial regardless of the resulting prejudice to the defendant.
The holding in Cary will in all likelihood discourage future defendants from
utilizing 2018(D). "There would be here no basis for a litigant's exclusion if there
were no bifurcation order in the case.""
B. Other Jurisdictions
By holding that Eric's exclusion was reversible error, the majority disregarded the
view articulated by a large number of courts examining the exclusion issue.
According to these courts,' " a litigant may be excluded if (1) his presence
prejudices the defendant, and (2) he cannot assist counsel in any meaningful way
or comprehend the proceedings. If both parts of this test are met, the trial court's
exclusion of a litigant is appropriate:

157. Id. at 206.
158. 702 P.2d 387 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).

159. See i at 391.
160. See id
161. Fritts v. McKinne, 934 P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).

162. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 204.
163. 1&at 212-13.
164. See Grunes, supra note 1, at 389. See generally Province v. Center for Women's Health &
Family Birth, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 675 (Ct. App. 1993); Caputo v. Sarcona Trucking Co., 611 N.Y.S.2d
655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 1995).
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Although the physical condition of a plaintiff, in and of itself, is not
enough to justify his involuntary exclusion from any phase of the trial,
when a plaintiff is both physically and mentally incapable and his
mental incapacity prevents him from assisting counsel in any meaningful
way, then the decision to exclude the plaintiff from the liability phase
of a trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.'
According to the standards followed by most courts, Eric's exclusion was
appropriate.
C. Due Process
The majority's decision denied Oneok the right to a fair trial. Article 2, section
7 of the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. A basic requirement of due process
is a "fair trial in a fair tribunal."' By creating a rule that a plaintiff may not be
excluded from tri,-d
on the basis of physical appearance in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, the majority created a situation fostering bias. When a
"trial court determines [that] the plaintiffs mere presence would prejudice the jury,
then failure to exclude the plaintiff during the liability phase would deny the
defendant's right to an unbiased jury.""t If a plaintiff may not be excluded,
regardless of the prejudicial impact, the defendant is denied due process because his
trial will not be free of bias." The holding in Cary makes it quite difficult for a
defendant in a personal injury case to receive a fair trial. "The right to be heard
should not include the right to prejudice the jury. Indeed, unnecessary jury prejudice
may itself violate due process if it infringes upon the right to a fair trial."'"
D. Evidentiary Provisions
The majority opinion ignored the standard of relevancy set out in title 12, section
2401 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 2401 states, "[r]elevant evidence means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."'" In Cary, the fact of consequence in the
liability portion of the proceedings was whether Oneok was negligent. Eric's injuries
are not relevant to this determination. Eric's injuries do not tend to make the

165. Caputo, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
166. Hoerman v. Western Heights Bd. of Educ., 913 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
167. Morley v. Sup.-rior Court of Ariz., 638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981).
168. See 9 CHARLm ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2390 (1971) ("[A]lthough defendants win in 42% of the cases tried routinely, they win in 79% of the
cases in which the liability issue is submitted alone. These figures suggest that juries are moved by
sympathy when they have heard evidence of the extent of the plaintiffs injuries and that this influences
their decision on the liability issue."); see also Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.R.D. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("This Court finds that introduction of evidence offered only to prove damages poses a substantial risk
of impairing the jury's objectivity on the liability issue in this case.").
169. Grunes, supra note 1, at 395.
170. 12 OKLA. STAr. § 2401 (1991).
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defendant's negligence more or less probable. By ruling that Eric's exclusion was
reversible error, the majority disregarded the fact that even if he were permitted to
be present at trial, his injuries are not relevant to the liability issue.'
In addition, section 2403 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code states that relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. In Strubhartv. PerryMemorialHospitalTrustAuthority, "
the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that balancing relevancy against prejudice is
within the trial court's discretion and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence
of an abuse of discretion." Even assuming that Eric's presence is relevant to
Oneok's liability, the trial court may still exclude him if his presence would be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cary is similar to the
Richardson case. 74 In Richardson, the court concluded that the balancing process
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was relevant in determining
whether to exclude crippled minors from trial.' The Richardson court concluded
that while the presence of the minors was not evidence, their presence would
confuse the issues or mislead the jury. 76 The court stated further:
It is clear that the presence at trial during the liability phase of
children suffering from severe visible birth defects is inherently
prejudicial . . . . If the battle is emotional alone between newborn
infants and big business, there can be but one winner. Emotional
battles, however, should not be staged in a federal courtroom. We deal
in liability imposed not by emotion but by law. It is customary, in fact,
to instruct juries that "all persons including corporations are entitled to
a fair trial."1"
The reasoning followed by the court in Richardson is applicable to Cary. Eric's
presence would be inherently prejudicial to Oneok.
Similarly, Eric's presence could also be considered impermissible extrinsic
evidence. In Watson v. State,' the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
A jury looking about the courtroom, seeing objects brought into the
courtroom, has no right to consider such extrinsic material, and base

171. Further, the trial court's exclusion order was not reversible error according to the reasoning of
Patrickv. Oklahoma City, 41 P.2d 103 (Okla. 1935) ("Where a plaintiff suing for personal injuries fails
to show negligence of the defendant... exclusion of evidence regarding extent and probable duration
of injuries was not reversible error.").
172. 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
173. See id. at 269-70.
174. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
175. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Benedictin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1222 (S.D. Ohio 1985).

176. See id.
177. Id. at 1224.
178. 140 N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind. 1957). In Watson, the State failed to introduce any evidence of the
defendant's age, which was an element of the charged crime. There was no direct testimony given at trial
concerning the defendant's age, nor did the defendant take the witness stand.
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their verdict thereon, or draw inferences therefrom, without such
exhibits being properly referred to for their observation as evidence in
the trial. The same rule holds true as to persons within the view of the
jury during trfid.
Under the reasoning in Watson, when Eric's condition had not been admitted into
evidence during the liability phase of the trial," his presence in the courtroom
might cause the jurcrs to consider impermissible extrinsic material in reaching a
verdict.
Finally, the majority's opinion violated the principle underlying section 2102 of
the Oklahoma Evidence Code. This section states: "[t]his code shall be construed
to secure fairness in administration... to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined."'81 In Three "M" Investments, Inc. v. Ahrend
Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "Section 2102 brings flexibility as the
underlying principle for the code's application and interpretation . . . [T]he
evidentiary rules intend to invest the trial court with broad latitude.""'3 Further, in
Callison v. Callison,'" the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that the purpose of
the Oklahoma Evidence Code is to ascertain the truth and justly determine the
proceedings."8
The assessment of jury prejudice calls for an evidentiary determination.
It is therefore a matter which properly lies within the discretion of the
trial court. While the power to supervise trial proceedings is not
unlimited; it is vested in the trial court, and reasonably should extend
to the decision to exclude a party to a civil action."
If the majority would have adhered to the principle underlying section 2102,
Eric's exclusion would have been upheld. The trial court may exclude a person from
the courtroom if exclusion will further a just outcome. Eric's exclusion is
harmonious with the underlying principle of section 2102.
E. "Day in the Life" Films
The treatment of "day in the life" films is relevant to the exclusion issue. "Day
in the life" films show the details of a plaintiffs daily life so that the jury may
assess the plaintiffs injuries." These films have become quite common in

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 112.
See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing relevant evidence).
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2102 (Supp. 1993).
827 P.2d 1324 (0kla. 1992) (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1332.
687 P.2d 106 (Okla.1984).

185. See id. at 110.
186. Grunes, supra nte 1, at 396.
187. See Joseph M. Ferlihy, Beyond Words: The EvidentiaryStatus of "Dayin the Life" Films, 66
B.U. L. REV.133, 134 (1986).
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personal injury cases."s The dangers of these films are that they elicit jury
sympathy and are resistant to effective cross examination."s
The Supreme Court of Missouri excluded such films in Haley v. Byers
TransportationCo..'" The Haley court concluded that the films "constituted...
testimony from [the] plaintiff which was not subject to cross examination."'' The
court stated further that the impact of the films would have been to create sympathy
for the plaintiff out of proportion to the relevancy of the evidence."g The United
States District Court for the District of Maine followed the Haley approach in
Bolstridge v. Central Maine Power Co.. 3 The court excluded a "day in the life"
film because "admission of the tape [would] ... create the risk of distracting the
jury and unfairly prejudicing the Defendant, principally though not exclusively,
because the benefit of effective cross-examination is lost.""
The same type of analysis is appropriate for determining whether a plaintiffs
presence in the courtroom during the liability phase would unduly prejudice the
defendant. 9 ' Eric's presence is testimony of his injuries which is not subject to
cross examination. His presence, like a "day in the life" film, creates the risk of
distracting the jury and unfairly prejudicing Oneok.
V. Conclusion
There is no express constitutional right to be present at a civil trial However,
due process does require that a party have the opportunity to be heard.' The
majority of jurisdictions treat the determination to exclude a litigant from trial as a
responsibility within the trial court's discretion. These courts allow the trial judge
to balance the prejudicial effect of the plaintiffs presence with the defendant's right
to a fair trial. A large number of cases from other states hold that if a plaintiffs
presence will be prejudicial to the defendant and the plaintiff cannot meaningfully
assist counsel or comprehend the proceedings, the plaintiff may be excluded from
the liability phase of the proceedings.
In Cary, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to follow the approach adopted
by a majority of courts, holding instead that a plaintiff may not be excluded from
trial on the basis of physical appearance in the absence of exceptional circumstances. This new doctrine intrudes upon the discretion of trial courts and makes it

188. See Grines, supra note 1, at 406.

189. See id.
190. 414 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1967). The films showed the plaintiff engaging in the following
activities: (1) getting in and out of a wheelchair, (2) getting into an appliance which permitted him to

move in an upright position, (3) moving his legs manually to accomplish bodily movements, and (4)
raising himself from certain places and positions by means of an overhead bar. See id. at 780.
191. Id. at 780.
192. See id.
193. 621 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Me. 1985).
194. Id. at 1204.
195. See Grunes, supra note 1, at 406.
196. See id. at 1223.
197. See supra note 6.
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difficult for a defendant in a personal injury case to receive a fair trial. Additionally, the majority failed to reconcile its holding with applicable Oklahoma law that
conflicts with its position. The rationale underlying the majority's opinion is
incorrect. Instead of solving the exclusion issue in Oklahoma, the majority created
bad precedent.
Kristy Freeman
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